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A Practicable Project: Canada, the 
United States, and the Construction of 
the DEW Line
Alexander W.G. Herd
“We are talking just as if we could move up in Canada and do 
what we damn please without the Canadians and anything else, 
and not getting them into it.”
— US Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, 19531
Charles Wilson’s comment counters conventional Canadian percep-tions: here, during the early Cold War, a high-ranking American official expresses concern for the American intrusion into Canadian 
affairs. Wilson was in the minority within the American government of the 
day, a time in which both Canadian and American political and military 
leaders made critical decisions on their countries’ respective national se-
curity and jointly on the overall defence of the North American continent. 
One joint decision involved the construction of the Distant Early Warning 
(DEW) Line, a line of radar stations to detect a Soviet aerial attack, across the 
Arctic. This decision was fraught with challenges and embodied aspects of 
Canada-United States continental defence relations also witnessed in later 
events.2 From the Canadian perspective, during the Cold War these relations 
were characterized by American pressure to coordinate Canadian defence 
policies with United States defence policy, Canadian concern for territorial 
sovereignty – particularly in the Canadian Arctic, tense competition between 
American and Canadian business interests, Canadian and American public 
opinion on the extent of defence cooperation between the two countries, and 
the Canadian struggle for equal partnership with the United States in con-
tinental defence projects.
 An understanding of Canada-United States defence cooperation re-
quires recognition of American and Canadian popular views of each other.3 
Canadians typically pay more attention to the United States than vice versa, 
being sensitive to American public opinion of their country and influenced 
in their thought by major American social, economic, military, and polit-
ical events. Conversely, Americans are generally limited in their interest in 
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Canada, take Canada for granted, and commonly assume that Canadians 
take the same attitude on domestic and foreign issues.4 American and 
Canadian views of the Soviet Union during the Cold War illustrate the differ-
ences of opinion between the two countries. Though both countries’ citizens 
viewed the Soviets as a threat to Western democracy, mistrust of the Soviets 
was more deeply embedded in the American psyche.5 Canadians adopted a 
reserved and pragmatic approach to the Cold War, displaying “very little of 
the doctrinaire self-righteousness inherent in the American approach.”6 As 
a result of this situation, the Canadian government’s decision to participate 
with the United States in continental defence projects was due to the gov-
ernment’s perception that the United States directly threatened Canadian 
sovereignty more than the Soviet Union.7 
Map 7. Federal Electric Company, 1960.
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 The air defence system was the key component to North American con-
tinental defence during the Cold War. The years 1953 and 1954 represent the 
crucial period in Canada-United States continental air defence cooperation. 
These years were preceded by a decade of moves on both sides of the border 
that brought Canadian and American defence policies closer together in a 
common effort to defend North America from the threat of Soviet nuclear at-
tack. Canada-United States continental defence cooperation in the modern era 
began with the Ogdensburg Agreement between Canadian Prime Minister 
William Lyon Mackenzie King and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 
August 1940. This agreement committed the two countries to “consider 
jointly the defence of North America as a single problem.”8 The Permanent 
Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) was created at this time to fulfill this role. The 
Joint Board was composed of two national sections, each consisting of a civil-
ian chairman, two representatives from the State Department/Department of 
External Affairs, and three or four military representatives.9
 Continental defence cooperation increased proportionately in the post-
war era. During the winter following the end of the Second World War, the 
two countries undertook a joint defence exercise in the Arctic.10 In February 
1946 the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) was created, consisting of 
the American and Canadian military members of the PJBD. Whereas the 
PJBD was an advisory body, the MCC formulated joint defence plans for the 
Joint Board’s approval.11 The MCC drafted the Joint Canadian-United States 
Basic Security Plan in June 1946. The Plan’s Joint Task No.1 was the protection 
of vital areas in Canada and the United States from air attack.12 In the winter 
of 1947 jointly constructed weather stations were established in northern 
Canada13 and in February 1947 the two governments made a joint public an-
nouncement on their decision to continue continental defence collaboration 
in peacetime, without any formal treaty or contractual obligation.14
 With the increased urgency of continental air defence, a close relation-
ship developed between the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the 
United States Air Force (USAF) during the late 1940s. At the 1948 May Day 
Parade, the Soviets displayed new long-range bomber aircraft and in August 
1949 the Soviets conducted their first atomic detonation. Shortly afterwards, 
American defence analysts predicted that the Soviet Union would have 150 
atomic bombs for delivery in a devastating attack on the United States by 
1954.15 At this time another joint organization was formed and served as 
a vehicle for continental defence development: the Canada-United States 
Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG), one of five North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) regional defence groups. Within the framework of 
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this group, the United States’ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) realized that the 
principal military requirement for the Canada-United States region was 
defence against Soviet atomic attack.16 The USAF began construction of the 
“Permanent” early warning radar network across the United States at the 
end of the decade, submitting requests for its extension into Canada at the be-
ginning of the 1950s. In the early years of this decade, the two air forces made 
numerous plans for tactical cooperation in air defence training, interception 
of enemy aircraft over North American territory, and other complicated air 
defence arrangements.17
 Meanwhile, the first Canadian studies of early warning were conducted 
in the Arctic in 1946. This project had been discarded, however, due to its 
high costs and impracticality.18 By 1951 the United States government had 
initiated more extensive continental air defence studies, including plans 
for Arctic early warning systems. That year at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT), scientists conducted a study, Project Charles, on the 
technical problems of air defence.19 Project Charles resulted in the forma-
tion of the MIT Lincoln Laboratory, which designed computerized early 
warning data-handling equipment, known as Semi-Automatic Ground 
Environment (SAGE). In 1952 the United States Department of Defense col-
laborated with the National Security Resources Board and the Federal Civil 
Defense Administration on a study called Project East River. This project’s 
report recommended an early warning network in the Canadian Arctic at 
the head of a defence-in-depth system (anti-aircraft units and interceptor 
fighter planes in Canada stationed behind the Arctic line). That same year 
the Lincoln Laboratory conducted its own Summer Study Group (SSG) re-
port. This report recommended two distant early warning lines across the 
Canadian Arctic, one at the 70th parallel, another at the 75th parallel.20 The 
Summer Study Group involved two Canadians, one from McGill University 
in Montreal, the other from the Defence Research Board (DRB). As a result 
of these individuals’ work at MIT, the DRB began developing cost-saving, 
unmanned radar equipment. The “McGill Fence” was initially proposed to 
form a back-up warning line along the 54th parallel to the SSG’s two “DEW 
lines.”21
 By the end of 1952, US President Harry S. Truman’s National Security 
Council (NSC) had formulated plans it believed were necessary for the de-
fence of the continent against Soviet aerial attack. On 31 December, in one of 
his last acts as president, Truman approved NSC-139. This plan called for the 
establishment, by 31 December 1955, of an air defence system (particularly 
in the Arctic) to provide three to six hours early warning of Soviet aerial 
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attack. The implementation of these plans, however, was left to Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s administration, which first took office in 1953.22 
 This chapter discusses one of the most important developments in 
Canada-United States defence relations during the Cold War. A careful as-
sessment of the primary evidence reveals that the Canadian government 
did not passively subordinate its continental defence policy to the United 
States in the joint arrangements of 1954 for the construction of the DEW 
Line. Canadian political and military officials withstood American pressure 
and shaped this continental air defence project to protect their interests. 
Canadian-American collaboration on the DEW Line was part of the two coun-
tries’ cooperation on the other two early warning lines, the Pinetree network 
in southern Canada and Newfoundland and the Mid-Canada Line along the 
55th parallel. Scholars have largely focused on the significance of the North 
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to joint North American 
Cold War defence, to the neglect of the cooperation on the early warning 
lines.23 However, these collaborative efforts during the first two years of the 
Eisenhower administration and Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent’s second 
administration in Ottawa produced the most important results in contin-
ental air defence: the early warning lines were conceptually established (if 
not materially), the level of Canada-United States cooperation significantly 
increased and moved both countries toward a unified air defence command, 
and, in a twist of historical irony, both nations’ governments realized that 
the pending intercontinental ballistic missile threat would render the early 
warning programmes obsolete by 1960. The particular case of the Canada-
United States decision in 1954 on the construction of the DEW Line illustrates 
Canada’s struggle for control in continental air defence projects and provides 
a microcosm of Canada-United States defence relations.
	 In June 1954 the Joint Canada-United States Military Study Group (MSG) 
– composed of air force planners and created in 1953 to determine the oper-
ational requirements for a chain of Arctic radar stations – recommended the 
establishment of the Distant Early Warning Line. The MSG reported this 
line was necessary to keep “abreast of anticipated improvements in Soviet 
capabilities” and allow the timely employment of US Strategic Air Command 
forces and other military and civil defence measures.24 The MSG recom-
mended that the Canadian and American governments “agree in principle” 
on the establishment of this line across the “most northerly practicable part 
of North America.”25 While the United States government’s approval of this 
report was prompt, the Canadians hesitated. At a July meeting of the PJBD, 
the American chairman declared that the DEW project was “receiving great 
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emphasis within the U.S. Government” and the president, the NSC, and the 
American Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved its construction.26 The American 
section of the board pressed the Canadians for an “agreement in principle 
between the two Governments on the need for such a line.”27 
 The United States government’s enthusiastic response to the MSG re-
port caused consternation among Canadian officials. These officials feared 
a quick decision by their government would result in complete American 
control of the DEW Line, limiting Canada’s “freedom of action” in this pro-
ject and threatening the country’s sovereignty. R. A. MacKay, an official with 
long experience in Canada’s Department of External Affairs,28 saw only two 
alternatives: let Canada build the Mid-Canada Line and the United States 
build the DEW Line, or “evolve” another joint enterprise to build both lines.29 
MacKay pushed for the latter alternative and stressed the importance of full 
Canadian participation in the DEW Line’s construction.
	 A major sticking point in discussions of the Distant Early Warning Line 
was, like the other lines, the choice of equipment. In July, US Admiral Arthur 
Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that Canadian con-
cerns with the proposed American equipment inhibited the two countries 
from reaching a full agreement on the procedure for establishing the DEW 
Line. Radford claimed that the Canadians were “fearful” that the Soviets 
would deliberately and constantly trigger off (“spoof”) American radar 
equipment.30 Eisenhower confirmed with his staff, however, that one of 
the Mid-Canada Line’s purposes was to determine whether the DEW Line 
was being “spoofed” or an actual enemy aircraft was inbound. Secretary of 
Defense Wilson knew Canadian officials were sensitive about the extent of 
their participation in the DEW Line, particularly from a financial standpoint. 
A Canadian contribution of “a few million dollars” was the equivalent of US 
“two or three billion dollars.”31
 Eisenhower and his officials also discussed with Robert C. Sprague the 
technical and economic advantages of American equipment for the Distant 
Early Warning Line. Sprague was chairman of the board of the Sprague 
Electric Company of North Adams, Massachusetts and an authority on elec-
tronic devices. In 1953, Sprague had been appointed to a subcommittee of the 
US Senate Armed Services Committee to participate in a full study of contin-
ental defence. He provided the senators on the subcommittee with his expert 
analysis of the various proposals for the protection of the United States by 
various types of radar fences.32 At the end of this study, Sprague submitted 
a detailed report on continental defence to the Senate committee in March 
1954.33 In late July 1954, as a consultant to the NSC, Sprague stated that the 
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MSG had proven, through experiments, that the American-made Western 
Electric manned radar stations were “workable” for operation of the DEW 
Line and also claimed that the Canadian-made McGill unmanned detection 
stations were more easily “spoofed” than Western Electric’s equipment.34 As 
a result of these discussions, Eisenhower pressed Wilson to persuade his 
Canadian counterparts of the importance of the early warning lines’ oper-
ational readiness, “with a view to getting a decision as soon as possible.”35
 In Canada, the concern over the DEW Line’s equipment choice was an 
element of officials’ overall concern with the nature and extent of Canada’s 
participation in the construction of the Arctic line. The Canadian govern-
ment had assumed overall responsibility for the Mid-Canada Line in June, 
the same month that the MSG recommended the establishment of the 
DEW Line. Despite MacKay’s suggestion for a joint effort for both lines, the 
Canadian government’s defence policymaking body, the Cabinet Defence 
Committee (CDC), decided to maintain the Mid-Canada Line as a Canadian-
built project, to ensure the government’s authority in decision-making and 
control of costs and to avoid subordinating Canadian plans to those of its 
American neighbour. Additionally, Canadian construction of the Mid-
Canada Line had demonstrated to American officials and to the Canadian 
public that Canada was doing its share to protect the continent. However, 
the Mid-Canada Line commitment limited Canada’s ability to contribute to 
the DEW Line. American pressure to construct the DEW Line according to 
American designs made the domestic “political consequences [for Canada]… 
most undesirable.”36 The CDC, to avoid this situation and protect Canadian 
sovereignty, recommended that the government maintain its responsibil-
ity for sole construction of the Mid-Canada Line, reach an agreement with 
the United States government on the division of costs of the DEW Line, and 
undertake this line as a joint Canada-United States project.37
 On 29 July 1954, Ralph Campney, Canada’s Minister of National Defence 
(MND), suggested in Cabinet that “approval in principle be given” for the 
establishment of the DEW Line.38 On 18 August the Canadian administra-
tion agreed on the need for this line. Cabinet officials left considerable lee-
way in their commitment, however, requesting that the United States accept 
this agreement “without prejudice” to the extent of Canadian participation, 
which was subject to further preliminary studies on the costs involved in the 
DEW Line.39 Prime Minister St. Laurent hoped this decision quelled earlier 
“suggestions in U.S. quarters” that Canada was not proceeding as rapidly as 
capable on continental defence development.40
 From August 1954 to year’s end, Canadian officials grappled with 
the overall Canadian contribution to early warning and how to balance 
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American control of projects. General Charles Foulkes, Canada’s Chairman, 
Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCOS), was critical of the government’s plans 
for the Mid-Canada and DEW Lines. As CCOS, Foulkes was at the top of 
Canada’s military hierarchy and served as the MND’s principal military 
advisor. A politically astute military chief, he supported closer Canada-
United States military relations and therefore had a direct interest in joint 
continental defence projects. Foulkes disapproved of an External Affairs 
draft submission to the CDC that authorized the United States to proceed 
with preliminary work on the DEW Line before the MSG had completed 
further studies on the location of this line and its organization and equip-
ment. These studies would determine cost and manpower estimates, en-
abling the government to assess its potential participation in the project. 
The CCOS did not believe that the Pinetree network, the Mid-Canada Line, 
and the DEW Line could form an effective early warning system. Nor did 
Foulkes believe that an integrated early warning system would be econom-
ically beneficial to Canada. He questioned the value of the Mid-Canada 
Line in such a system, since the DEW Line was designed to both identify 
and detect aircraft, the latter the Mid-Canada Line’s main purpose. For 
Foulkes, American construction of the DEW Line gave the impression to 
the American and Canadian publics that the Americans were responsible 
for and controlled the Canadian Arctic. He also accused the US Western 
Electric Company as “in this business for profit.”41 According to the general, 
his American counterpart, Admiral Radford, had similar views of the DEW 
and Mid-Canada Line projects.42 
 Further studies by the two air forces convinced Foulkes and the Chiefs of 
Staff (who, as a group, shared the chairman’s scepticism) that a comprehen-
sive early warning system at the earliest possible date was “vital.”43 The two 
air forces established the RCAF-USAF Military Characteristics Committee, 
DEW Group. This group’s purpose was to develop “mutually acceptable” 
military characteristics and operational requirements for the DEW Line.44 The 
group’s studies provided the basis for the selection of equipment, manpower 
and cost estimates, and “other related actions essential to early installation 
of the land based segment of the DEW line.”45 The Military Characteristics 
Committee subsequently concluded that the Mid-Canada Line and the air 
control and warning system (the Pinetree network) were insufficient for 
the required state of preparedness for Canadian and American air defence 
forces.46
 The above group’s report, in addition to the MSG’s Fourth Interim 
Report, helped the Chiefs of Staff view the establishment of the DEW Line by 
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1957 as “a requirement of great military importance.” Both countries believed 
that an effective continental defence first protected the North American 
bases possessing retaliatory capability and then protected major industrial 
and population centres. In the chiefs’ estimate, the DEW Line would provide 
the two hours warning required by the Strategic Air Command and “other 
users.” The change in the chiefs’ attitude towards the early warning lines 
as a whole was expressed in their belief that a completed DEW Line aug-
mented the Pinetree and Mid-Canada radar stations.47 With the top military 
leaders’ support, Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. 
Pearson, and Campney affirmed the CDC’s earlier recommendation that the 
Canadian government agree with the United States on the construction of 
the DEW Line as a joint project, the extent of Canadian participation in this 
construction to be determined in the future.48
Map 8. From Matthew Farish, “Frontier Engineering: From the Globe to the Body in the 
Cold War Arctic,” The Canadian Geographer 50/2 (2006)
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To balance Canadian participation in the DEW project with American leader-
ship of the programme, the CDC also worked to consolidate the early warn-
ing programmes. At an October meeting of the PJBD, the American section 
had informed the Canadians that the United States government, as a result of 
a report by the Western Electric Company, considered the construction of the 
DEW Line as feasible. The Western Electric report stated that if work began 
in 1955, then the line would be operable by 1957. This report based its data 
on the potential DEW Line consisting of a combination of scanning radars 
and modified McGill Fence equipment, running from Cape Lisburne in 
northwestern Alaska to Davis Strait (between Baffin Island and Greenland). 
The estimated cost of the line was approximately $200 million, with a total 
manpower requirement of 700 – 1000 personnel.49 The chair of the American 
section, PJBD stressed the importance of the two governments reaching an 
early agreement on the construction of the line, in order for the DEW Line 
to be operational by 1957. The American officers declared that the American 
government was prepared to accept full responsibility for this line, granting 
Western Electric the construction contract.50
 At a meeting on 12 November, the CDC considered the Western Electric 
study and the American requests for construction of the DEW Line. The 
challenge still remained whether Canadian military personnel were able to 
participate in the DEW project because of Canadian responsibility for the 
Mid-Canada Line. The Chiefs of Staff had agreed that the Arctic line should 
be built between Cape Lisburne and Davis Strait, but they found it “undesir-
able” for the RCAF to participate in the line’s construction, as the air force’s 
technical resources were heavily committed to the Mid-Canada Line. Due to 
the urgency of the project, the chiefs recommended that, if the Canadian gov-
ernment decided to participate in construction, then it should authorize the 
United States government to take “necessary” preliminary measures, includ-
ing the stockpiling of supplies and transportation arrangements. Conversely, 
if the Canadian government decided not to participate in the DEW Line’s 
construction, the chiefs recommended that the United States be authorized 
to proceed immediately, but under “certain terms and conditions.”51 
 The Cabinet Defence Committee came to the conclusion that the 
American proposals, as presented to the Canadian section of the PJBD, 
amounted to a “crash programme.” Canadian officials were sceptical about 
the construction cost and manpower estimates. There were more problems 
inherent in establishing the DEW Line than US officials realized. To solve 
the Canadian government’s dilemma over control of the DEW project, the 
CDC decided that the early warning lines, though distinct in location and 
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purpose, “should be regarded as one whole project.” This meant that each 
country would have responsibility (but not exclusive control) for a seg-
ment of the system. For “administrative reasons,” the United States would 
be responsible for the construction of the system’s “far northern element.” 
This did not, however, mean complete American control of construction. 
The establishment of exclusively United States installations on the northern 
border of Canada was “undesirable from the point of view of the general 
national interest.” Canadian entities would provide transportation facilities 
and some of the equipment during the construction phase of the line.52 
	 This scenario slightly altered the previous arrangements for the joint 
air defence projects. The three early warning lines were now considered 
elements constituting “an over-all continental defence warning system, the 
establishment of which is being undertaken as a joint Canada – United States 
project.”53 Canadian policy, both publicly and privately, aimed to preserve 
Canadian rights in control and in participation of the overall system. The 
Cabinet Defence Committee recommended that both governments issue a 
public announcement, explaining the overall early warning system to both 
countries’ citizens and the responsibilities of each government in its estab-
lishment. This statement, Canadian officials hoped, would also clarify that 
any construction and operation of the northern line was subject to the same 
general principles of other joint defence projects in Canada, in particular the 
Pinetree network.54 
 Thereafter, in November 1954 the responsibility of DEW Line negotiations 
moved from the PJBD to Canadian-American high-level foreign relations 
officials, with discussions now run through diplomatic channels.55 On 16 
November, the Canadian ambassador to the United States, A.D.P. Heeney, in-
formed US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles of the Canadian government’s 
plans for an overall joint warning system. As a matter of formality, the am-
bassador reviewed the components of the system. The Canadian government 
agreed that its responsibility was the Mid-Canada Line, north of the “settled 
areas of Canada.” Heeney’s government also agreed that the United States’ 
responsibilities were the DEW system, across the “most northerly practicable 
part of North America,” and the seaward extensions of the system, covering 
the seaward approaches. Heeney also informed Dulles that American author-
ities could proceed with preliminary measures for the DEW Line, including 
the procurement, shipment, and placement of construction materials.56
 Canadian policymakers realized that they were financially and ma-
terially unable to fully construct the DEW Line; in the face of inevitable 
American construction of this line, the Canadian government wanted as-
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surances that any American plan was carried out with Canadian consent. 
Therefore, Heeney informed Dulles, the United States’ role in the DEW pro-
ject was subject to particular Canadian government guidelines.57 These terms 
and conditions for American participation in the DEW Line were formulated 
and submitted to the United States government in mid-November. Many of 
the conditions were similar to statements made with respect to the construc-
tion of the Pinetree radar stations in early 1953.58 The list of conditions read 
like a litany of Canadian sovereignty sensitivities and desire for control. All 
DEW plans were dependent on mutual consultation. A DEW Project Office, 
established by American officials and the management contractor appointed 
by the United States, would be the “instrument for effective consultation be-
tween the Canadian and United States agencies concerned.”59 The location of 
station sites, airstrips, roads, buildings, and construction plans were subject 
to Canadian inspection and discussion with the appropriate Canadian au-
thorities, “if requested.”60 
 The United States was also required, “to the fullest extent practicable,” 
to give Canadian construction contractors, commercial air carriers, and 
shipping equal opportunity for participation in the construction phase of 
the DEW project.61 Preference for Canadian labour in this phase was also 
required. Canadian law applied to all aspects of the project, including immi-
gration and customs regulations, taxes, and ownership of “removable prop-
erty.”62 Under Canadian law, special attention was given to the protection 
of wildlife and “objects of archaeological interest or historic significance” in 
the Northwest Territories and Yukon Territory. American personnel were 
also asked to respect the Inuit communities living in close proximity to the 
project. They were also required to provide relevant scientific data (such as 
geological, topographical, hydrographical, and geophysical information) to 
Canadian officials. 
 Moreover, the Canadian government would allow the stationing of US 
military and civilian government personnel at the DEW Line stations, but 
only after consultation between the two governments. The United States was 
authorized to initially operate and man the DEW Line, but the Canadian 
government reserved the right at any time to take over the operation and 
manning “of any or all of the installations.” The two governments agreed to 
maintain the DEW system in operation for ten years; the duration of oper-
ation would change only “in the light of their mutual defence interests.” After 
this period of time, the PJBD was to address any questions on the continuing 
need of the DEW system. Following the Joint Board’s consideration, either 
government could decide to close installations along the line.63
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 The Canadian government’s conditions were similar to previous stipula-
tions on continental air defence projects, particularly on the provision of elec-
tronic equipment for the DEW Line. The Canadian government reaffirmed 
“the principle that electronic equipment at installations on Canadian terri-
tory should, as far as practicable, be manufactured in Canada.” The “prac-
ticability” of using Canadian electronic equipment was a matter of consul-
tation, through the DEW Project Office, between Canadian and American 
agencies.64 This condition promptly became a matter of dispute, with argu-
ments familiar to the debate surrounding equipment for the Pinetree Line. 
American air defence planners had long-favoured their own equipment for 
the early warning lines; they summarily requested a revision to the above 
condition that “equalized” the chances of American-made equipment being 
used on the DEW Line.65
 In response, Lester Pearson instructed the Canadian embassy in 
Washington to relay his views on the proposed American revision to the 
State Department. Pearson stated that neither the strategic importance of 
industrial production nor the need to develop alternate sources of supply 
in Canada could be neglected in defence planning. He believed that the 
Canadian electronics industry must be given the opportunity to participate 
in the actual production of equipment (especially in the field of radar) to 
“play an effective part in the joint defence of the North American continent.” 
The external affairs minister also argued that it was only through the experi-
ence of manufacturing this type of equipment that Canadian industry could 
“be kept in readiness to meet wartime demands.”66
 Pearson reiterated the principle that electronic equipment for radar 
systems on Canadian territory should be made in Canada “as far as practic-
able.” The basis of Canada-United States consultation on this matter, Pearson 
opined, was the mutual recognition that “practicability” must include stra-
tegic, commercial, and economic considerations. From Pearson’s standpoint, 
the proposed American revision was the “antithesis” of this concept of “prac-
ticability” and if applied, the Canadian electronics industry would find itself 
in an “impossible position” to meet the proposed American requirements. 
Pearson rebutted the American claim that the American proposal granted 
equal opportunity to both the United States and Canadian electronics indus-
tries and postulated that the opposite would occur. The American proposal 
would load the conditions for equipment procurement “heavily in favour” of 
its industry and make the Canadian government’s position in dealing with 
its own industry “untenable.”67
 Having made clear his views on the American proposal, the Secretary 
of State for External Affairs assured his American counterparts that the 
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Canadian government had no intentions to impose unreasonable conditions 
or demands on them. Pearson commented that “[i]n our view it is not too 
much to ask” the United States government to defer, on account of previous 
cooperative ventures, to Canadian judgment on the importance of “practic-
ability.” Pearson would not support the provision of Canadian-made equip-
ment for the DEW Line if that equipment would adversely affect the project. 
Pearson knew, despite these assurances, that the issue of the DEW Line’s 
electronic equipment would not be immediately resolved. He noted to the 
embassy in Washington that this matter was “one likely to present a diffi-
culty in the early conclusion of an agreement on the DEW Line.”68
 Another slight problem occurred with respect to the joint announce-
ment on Canada-United States continental air defence. This announcement 
was issued simultaneously in Ottawa and Washington at noon EST on 19 
November 1954 and made public the governments’ decision to “proceed 
with the construction of the Distant Early Warning Line” and that the 
United States government was responsible for the construction and instal-
lation of this line.69 The Pentagon, however, delivered the text of this an-
nouncement to reporters 18 hours before the scheduled release by both gov-
ernments to their respective presses. Consequently, as Pearson told Heeney, 
“You should draw to the attention of the State Department the difficulty 
which this has caused us.”70
 The problem was that the Canadian cabinet had wanted to include in both 
governments’ press releases its earlier statement that the same general condi-
tions and principles that governed other joint defence projects in Canada also 
applied to this latest project. The Pentagon’s early issue of the draft public an-
nouncement precluded this addition to the United States government’s press 
release. The Canadian government’s press officer nevertheless released this 
information to the Canadian press. The press officer summarized the gov-
ernment’s conditions on the reservation of Canadian title to all land required 
for the DEW system, the application of Canadian law, the Canadian right to 
take over the operation and manning of any of the American installations, 
and the equal consideration to Canadian and American contractors for con-
struction and procurement of materials. Additionally, the Canadian press 
was informed that American agencies were to give preference to Canadian 
labour, respect Inuit interests, and were accountable to the “underlying prin-
ciple” that all cooperative arrangements were not to impair either country’s 
control over activities in their own territory.71
 As a result, the Canadian and American publics received different re-
ports on a vital joint defence project between their two countries, leading 
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to a disparity between the respective publics’ perceptions of continental 
air defence. The Pentagon’s early release of its information undercut the 
Canadian government’s attempts to ensure that citizens from both countries 
understood the role of Canadian sovereignty in continental air defence. The 
American public therefore did not understand the extent to which their DEW 
Line agencies were subject to Canadian conditions. This situation had the 
potential to cause further problems down the road; if the American public 
perceived that the Canadian government was delaying the urgent task of 
establishing defence against the Soviet threat, the United States govern-
ment would feel public pressure to bring the Canadians in line with stated 
American objectives. Then the Canadian government would face more 
American obstinacy in defence cooperation. The lesson learned, Pearson 
noted, was that both governments had to specify both the release time of a 
joint announcement and the time of delivery to the press.72
 Obviously, the establishment of the DEW Line in the Canadian Arctic 
was not a straightforward task. This fact was not only true in Canada – 
United States cooperation, but also among the numerous departments of 
Canada’s government with a hand in the DEW project. On 22 November 
1954, External Affairs circulated a review of the cabinet conclusions on DEW 
Line arrangements and copies of the draft conditions for American partici-
pation. These documents were sent to the deputy ministers of Northern 
Affairs and National Resources, Transport, National Revenue (Customs and 
Excise Division), National Revenue (Income Tax Division), Citizenship and 
Immigration, and Labour, and to the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police.73
 Some of the department heads approved of the conditions. The deputy 
minister of Northern Affairs suggested, in order to enforce sovereignty, that 
the Canadian flag should be flown at all major DEW system installations 
and anywhere the United States flag was displayed outdoors.74 Others re-
sponded with queries demonstrative of the Canadian concern for controlling 
American participation. David Sim, the deputy minister of National Revenue 
(Customs and Excise), was concerned with the exemptions granted for the 
disposal of American material on Canadian territory under “Ownership of 
Removable Property.”75 Sims noted that his department was one whose con-
currence was required before the disposal of any duty- and tax-free goods 
occurred. He referred to his department’s previous experience with the 
Pinetree network, stating that there were “substantial problems” with the 
United States on similar matters related to this project and that these prob-
lems may bear on the granting of future exemptions.76
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 As a result of Sim’s comments, External Affairs planned to add a provi-
sion to the conditions on removable property. An exchange of notes between 
the governments on 11 and 18 April 1951 concerning the disposal of excess 
American property in Canada would apply to the DEW project. External 
Affairs requested Sim’s opinion, based on his experience with Pinetree, on 
the necessary procedures in this matter for the Distant Early Warning Line.77 
Sim found it difficult to formulate specific procedures at this point in time for 
the DEW project and first needed answers to several pertinent questions. He 
requested from External Affairs information on the extent of the US Corps of 
Engineers’ role in construction work, whether or not there would be a main 
contractor or subcontractors, and whether American or Canadian equipment 
was to be used. Similarly, the deputy minister requested information on 
what portion of and types of supplies would be bought in Canada directly 
or through Canadian Crown Agencies.78 With Sim’s queries, External Affairs 
officials were now concerned that the appropriate American officials under-
stood the deputy minister’s standpoint and contacted their defence counter-
parts on this matter. External Affairs’ Benjamin Rogers wrote to the deputy 
minister of National Defence that “I am not at all sure that the United States 
authorities concerned with the project appreciate the need for giving early 
attention to these problems.” He recommended that representatives from the 
Western Electric Company and the USAF come to Ottawa to clarify this issue 
with National Revenue officials.79
 Other federal ministries also expressed pertinent concerns about 
American participation. J. R. Baldwin, the deputy minister of Transport, 
informed Under Secretary of State for External Affairs Jules Léger that 
Canadian telecommunications carriers should have, “to the fullest extent 
practicable,” the opportunity to handle telecommunication circuits and traf-
fic during both the construction phase and the period of the DEW Line’s 
operation. Baldwin pushed for preference for Canadian shipping; he also 
wanted a Canadian observer placed on board any ship used in the sealift of 
equipment.80 External Affairs official Max H. Wershof noted to Baldwin that 
his recommendations regarding the use of Canadian telecommunications 
“may have important operational implications” requiring consideration by 
the Department of National Defence (DND).81
 Wershof forwarded Baldwin’s recommendations to Deputy Minister of 
National Defence C. M. Drury, commenting that “[i]t seems to me that a pro-
vision of this sort would have serious implications both with respect to the 
construction and operation of the Distant Early Warning System.”82 Drury, 
the deputy defence minister extraordinaire,83 disagreed with Baldwin’s 
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conditions. He informed Wershof that the US military was free to choose 
its telecommunications provider, whether Canadian or American, civilian or 
military. Drury stressed that under normal regulations Baldwin’s condition 
would not apply to Canadian forces. Therefore, in Drury’s opinion, Canadian 
government officials could not object to the American establishment of mil-
itary circuits under military control for operational purposes. Drury did state 
that the Canadian government reserved the right, under Canadian laws, to 
refuse at any time additional American civil circuits established in Canadian 
territory.84
 The additional conditions recommended by the Departments of National 
Revenue and Transport were two examples of the complexity Canadian offi-
cials faced in regulating American participation in the DEW Line. Establishing 
the extent of Canadian participation proved to be equally complex. At the 
end of November 1954 Drury provided Léger with his own views on the ex-
tent of Canadian participation in the DEW project, in reference to the CDC’s 
recommendation on 12 November “that at the same time the United States 
government be informed of Canada’s intention to participate in the project, 
the nature and extent of such participation to be more precisely determined 
in the near future.”85 Drury argued that the main purpose of Canadian par-
ticipation in the Distant Early Warning Line was to “give an indication of 
joint responsibility” and make it clear to the Canadian people that the United 
States was “not being permitted to carry out large projects in Canada on its 
own.” This purpose was partly achieved through the joint press release on the 
19th (i.e. north of the border). The central question, according to Drury, was 
what further measures of Canadian participation were necessary.86
 The Distant Early Warning project, Drury noted, was divided into two 
phases: (a) construction and installation; and (b) operation and maintenance. 
With respect to the latter, he noted, it was too early to consider the extent of 
Canadian participation, other than a few exceptions. He recommended that 
the RCAF consider its participation in the manning of the line and associ-
ated communications and proposed that Canadian agencies conduct logistic 
support studies of the line. The construction and installation phase was con-
strained, as noted, by the Canadian agencies’ technical and managerial com-
mitment to the Mid-Canada Line. Consequently, it was in the deputy minis-
ter’s opinion that USAF designs and plans for the DEW Line “will have to be 
accepted, largely without scrutiny and that any financial responsibility that 
Canada might undertake would be in the way of a nearly blank cheque.”87
 Drury suggested three possible courses of action for Canadian participa-
tion in the construction and installation phase of the DEW Line and their 
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advantages and disadvantages. First, the Canadian government could pay 
for all the electronic equipment produced in Canada, encouraging the line’s 
general contractor to place orders in Canada. In Drury’s view, however, pro-
duction became expensive when the design authority spent “someone else’s 
money.” Secondly, the Canadian government could pay for the transporta-
tion costs for services rendered by Canadian agencies. Drury believed that 
this action, however, would be a limited one. He did not see this move in-
fluencing the volume of business for Canadian agencies, either positively or 
negatively. Total sum payments for transportation would not be very large 
because of Canada’s limited resources in this field. Consequently, in Drury’s 
opinion, this choice would relegate Canadian participation to a “subsidiary 
activity.”88
 The third possibility was for the Canadian government to contribute 
a stipulated sum towards the overall cost of the DEW Line. This decision 
would limit Canadian liability but, Drury cautioned, if the sum was not sub-
stantial, then Canadian participation would be relegated to a minor role in 
the project. Though Drury did not necessarily advocate either of the first two 
courses of action, he was against the last option. As a result of increasing 
expenditures for air defence in the future, a gratuitous Canadian offer “of 
this character” would cause more difficulties than a solution to the current 
debate over the extent of Canadian participation.89
 At the beginning of December 1954, Lester Pearson was in New York 
for a session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. R. A. MacKay, 
upon review of Drury’s suggestions, sent a report to Pearson, appending his 
own suggestions in light of Drury’s thoughts on DEW Line participation. The 
theme was constant: MacKay recommended, due to the Canadian commit-
ment to the Mid-Canada Line, that “we should direct our part in the DEW 
Line in such a way that the Canadian economy will get the maximum benefit 
from our contribution and should not be concerned that the dollar value of 
our participation in the DEW Line will be low relative to the total cost of 
the project.”90 In reference to the last part of his analysis, MacKay claimed 
that sums spent on improvements to the DEW Line’s transportation system 
would benefit local communities. 
 MacKay favoured Drury’s first suggestion. If the Canadian government 
committed to pay up to $20 or $30 million (MacKay’s example) for Canadian-
produced electronic equipment, this decision would encourage the con-
tinued use of this equipment and maintain employment in the Canadian 
electronics industry. MacKay rebutted Drury’s belief that this decision would 
prove excessively expensive. The Canadian electronics industry, with respect 
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to the DEW Line, was limited in what it was expected to produce. Therefore, 
in MacKay’s opinion, Drury’s objections to this course of action were not 
to be taken too seriously. Conversely, MacKay agreed with Drury’s oppos-
ition to the contribution of a stipulated sum. He recommended instead the 
earmarking of additional Canadian funds for the Southern Canadian early 
warning system (the Mid-Canada Line). After all, MacKay observed, any 
attempt to maintain a similar financial position vis-à-vis the United States 
would put a tremendous strain on Canadian resources.91
 A week later MacKay reported to Pearson that Drury had convened 
a meeting on 7 December to discuss the continuing debate on Canadian 
participation in the DEW Line. In attendance were the deputy ministers of 
Northern Affairs and National Resources and Defence Production, prom-
inent Canadian economist John J. Deutsch, General Foulkes, Wershof, and 
Drury. The participants agreed that the purpose of Canadian participation in 
the DEW project was two-fold. The first dimension was to indicate the joint 
nature of the project and make clear to the Canadian people that the United 
States was not being permitted to carry out, on its own, large defence projects 
in Canada. The second was to ensure Canada’s continuing control of affairs 
in remote regions in which the operation of the DEW Line was the principal 
activity.92
 The group also considered the two phases of the project. Discussion 
of construction and installation again centred on the tension between the 
previous Canadian commitment to the Mid-Canada Line and the resulting 
American responsibility for this phase of the DEW Line. The representatives 
from National Defence and Defence Production ceded control of this phase 
to the United States. Along with Deutsch, Drury and the deputy minister 
of Defence Production argued that a Canadian financial contribution of 
anything less than $50 million to construction and installation was “mean-
ingless.” These men argued that an inadequate financial contribution would 
prove to be no more than a “grant” to the United States government since 
there was no apparatus to supervise the expenditure of these funds. In their 
opinion, Canadians obtained nothing from a gesture of this sort. Rather, 
the Canadian government and its agencies should focus their efforts on the 
second phase, the operation and manning of the line.93
 Drury and Foulkes repeated Drury’s earlier claim that National Defence 
intended to participate in the operation and manning of the line, but it was 
too soon to advise the government as to the scale and character of a sustain-
able degree of participation. The RCAF had been instructed to conduct stud-
ies of manning problems through the Joint Canada – United States Military 
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Study Group. In the defence representatives’ view, the government was to 
limit itself to vague statements about Canadian participation in this phase. 
In other words, they suggested that the government “should not go beyond 
a general assertion that Canada intended to participate in the project when 
it advanced to the operation phase.” The group did agree to include to the 
conditions governing the project the statement that Canada had a continuing 
interest in questions of resupply of the line and that the Canadian govern-
ment reserved the right of consultation by the Americans on arrangements 
of this matter.94
 This meeting demonstrated the division of opinion between diplomats 
and defence officials on the matter of Canada’s participation in the DEW Line. 
Wershof was disappointed that Drury and the deputy minister of Defence 
Production “could not see their way clear to recommending participation 
in the construction phase of the project.” The deputy minister of Northern 
Affairs and National Resources also sided with the defence officials, stating 
that he was more concerned with Canadian participation in the operation 
phase than in construction. Drury, despite Wershof’s opposition, informed 
the group that he was going to encourage his minister, Ralph Campney, to 
recommend that the Canadian government inform the United States gov-
ernment that Canada did not intend to participate in the construction and 
installation of the line, but did intend to participate in the line’s operation, the 
nature and extent of this participation to be determined at a later date.95 
 This meeting did not resolve the interdepartmental debate, which re-
mained an open question by the end of 1954. MacKay reported to Pearson 
that Wershof, after Drury had made his concluding remarks, “reserved the 
position of this Department [External Affairs] on the proposed negative rec-
ommendation (1) [for no participation in construction] but of course under-
took to bring the views of the meeting to your attention.”96 Pearson stood 
by his subordinates; his close relationship and “identity of views” with St. 
Laurent (Pearson had succeeded him as head of External Affairs) granted 
Pearson a more substantial amount of influence in the cabinet than his de-
fence counterpart.97 He noted to MacKay, “I am not prepared without further 
information to agree that we should have nothing to do with construction of 
this line.”98
 Whatever the degree of Canadian participation in the construction of 
the DEW Line, the United States shouldered the burden of its cost. In its early 
years, considerable controversy surrounded the DEW Line. The Canadian 
government, especially its external affairs and defence ministries, failed to 
curb American actions in the Arctic. American military and civilian person-
191
ALEXANDER W.G. HERD
nel did not respect Canadian sovereignty, leading scholar James Eayrs to 
make the apt observation that: 
Disturbing rumours trickle down from the northlands into parlia-
ment and the press, having a greater influence on public opinion 
than the fine print of the ‘Statement of Conditions to Govern the 
Establishment of a Distant Early Warning System in Canadian 
Territory,’ an agreement negotiated in 1955 and made public by 
the government in an attempt to allay just such misgivings.99 
The Pentagon’s early release of the 19 November 1954 joint announce-
ment had the effects Canadian officials feared: Many American citizens 
allegedly believed that their country had taken over the Canadian Arctic. 
The Canadian public also debated whether Canada should have been solely 
responsible for the DEW Line. This debate led to questions on the utility of 
the Mid-Canada Line in an integrated radar warning system, in light of the 
DEW Line’s capabilities.100
 The Distant Early Warning Line became operational on 15 May 1957. The 
line ran from Cape Dyer, Baffin Island, to Lisburne, Alaska. A second seg-
ment was added between Umnak, Aleutian Islands and Midway Island in the 
Pacific Ocean. The line was also extended to include Greenland. The line was 
composed of Doppler radars every 80 kilometres, smaller “gap filler” radar 
stations, and auxiliary radar stations every 160 kilometres. Station crews 
were a mix of military and civilian personnel, including Inuit employees.101 
During its existence, the DEW Line provided Canada and the United States 
both military advantages with its early warning system and non-military 
benefits with its system of logistics.102 
 Part of the line’s construction involved the construction of airstrips ad-
jacent to the stations. These airstrips were built by USAF Hercules transport 
planes parachuting Caterpillar D9 bulldozers onto the selected site. These 
bulldozers then levelled the ground for the airstrip. The bulldozers, too ex-
pensive to lift back out of the site, remained permanently with their work. 
Once the airstrip was complete, a hole was dug at the end of the runway 
and the bulldozer was buried. These airstrips were a boon to both military 
and civilian groups. Prior to their construction, planes landed only on natur-
ally flat parts of the Arctic, such as raised beaches. The man-made runways 
permitted access to areas of the Arctic previously limited by the landscape. 
Many took advantage of these opportunities. 
 Geological field teams, for example, were able to undertake mapping 
projects of areas previously not available to them. These types of teams were 
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based out of DEW Line radar stations, such as “Foxe 2,” on Baffin Island. To 
the west of Foxe 2 was “Foxe-Main” or Hall Beach, located on the Melville 
Peninsula. To the east of Foxe 2 was another station, Dewar Lakes. Stations 
were named for the terrain which they occupied. Foxe 2 was named for 
the Foxe Basin, north of the Great Plain of the Koukdjuak on Baffin Island. 
The topography around Foxe 2 was relatively flat, with relief in some parts 
ranging from 10 to 30 metres in height. Foxe 2 was sited for the DEW Line 
because its location enabled the station’s military personnel to look over the 
horizon. 
 Stations such as Foxe 2, located at the eastern end of the line, were 
serviced by the major air hub at Sondre Stromfjord, Greenland. Transport 
planes designed for short take-off and landing (STOL), such as DC-3 Dakotas 
and deHavilland Twin Otters, brought in supplies via the built airstrips. 
Field teams, such as the aforementioned one located at Foxe 2, usually re-
ceived their equipment, mail, and groceries from Winnipeg; in many cases 
the only telephone available was at the closest DEW Line station. The entire 
DEW Line was maintained on Central Time because the lines of longitude 
converged in the Arctic.103 
 The Distant Early Warning Line had a major military and scientific im-
pact on the Arctic. The logistical benefits it provided were just as important 
as its military purposes. DEW Line stations were also serviceable beyond 
tracking potential enemy aircraft or intercontinental ballistic missiles. The 
stations provided local security. If a civilian helicopter, contracted for re-
search, became unserviceable in the field, personnel from the nearest DEW 
Line station could track the aircraft’s last known position and help in its 
recovery.104 Additionally, after all the Canadian government’s concerns over 
the establishment of the early warning lines, the DEW Line had a major posi-
tive impact on Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. Increased accessibility 
translated into an increased Canadian presence in the Arctic, military and 
civilian. In the case of the latter, civilian researchers were able to discover 
new natural resources. One example was the discovery of some of the world’s 
largest iron deposits in the northern part of Baffin Island. These deposits, 
however, await the appropriate form of logistics for their proper exploitation.
 The limitations of the original technology of the 1950s meant that more 
stations were initially built than eventually needed. By the 1960s, techno-
logical advances allowed for greater radar coverage with fewer stations. In 
1963, all 31 gap filler sites (also known as Intermediate Sites, or “I Sites”) were 
abandoned.105 This decision had environmental consequences. These sta-
tions produced debris and pollution, caused by PCBs in their transformers.106 
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Clean up began in the late 1980s, when DEW Line stations were shut down or 
modernized as part of the North Warning System. 
 Canada’s cooperation with the United States on the DEW Line formed 
the major part of the Canadian government’s struggle for control of the early 
warning systems on its territory. In the end, the United States government 
paid the DEW Line’s construction and installation costs and sent large num-
bers of personnel to the Arctic to operate the line’s radar stations. Canadian 
officials worked hard to avoid American domination of the DEW project. 
Despite these officials’ worries, the DEW Line had the unintended conse-
quence of bolstering Canadian sovereignty through commercial exploration 
and exploitation. 
 1953 and 1954 were crucial years in North American air defence cooper-
ation. Friendly relations between Canada and the United States, coupled 
with the growing threat of the Soviet Union, brought the two countries closer 
together through joint plans to defend the continent. In the face of American 
pressure to build an effective air defence network, the realities of interest, 
history, and geography meant that the Canadian government possessed few 
other alternatives other than to support American designs. Canadian polit-
ical and military leaders also accepted the reality of the Soviet Union’s power 
and its increasing capabilities to inflict crippling damage on North America. 
Additionally, the Canadian commitment to effective continental air defence 
was in line with the country’s military commitments to NATO in Europe and 
to the UN in Korea (1950-1953). The Canadian government, in a challenging 
balancing act, made continental air defence efforts one element of its three-
pronged defence policy following the tradition of collective security.
 Canadian authorities struggled to control continental air defence on 
their territory. Once committed to the concept of defence-in-depth, with 
early warning networks, anti-aircraft units, and interceptor fighter aircraft, 
Canadian officials attempted to make a significant contribution to each joint 
defence project. They worked to control the overall costs of each project and 
maximize their country’s economic benefits by establishing a principle of 
preference for Canadian industry. The term “sovereignty” in continental air 
defence meant more than respect for Canadian territory. In effect it meant 
obtaining American respect for Canadian decisions in each step of a joint 
effort, regardless of the degree to which these decisions deviated from the 
plans of Canada’s southern neighbour. Unfortunately, this respect was not 
always forthcoming. 
 The joint Canada-United States decision in 1954 on the construction 
of the DEW Line represents Canada-United States Cold War defence rela-
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tions in microcosm. For the Canadian officials involved in this decision, 
these relations were often characterized by American pressure to coordin-
ate Canadian defence policies with American defence policy, concerns over 
territorial sovereignty, tense competition between American and Canadian 
business interests, heightened Canadian and American public awareness on 
the nature of joint defence cooperation, and a Canadian struggle for equal 
partnership in continental defence projects. Canadian officials’ attempt at de-
lineating the American role in the DEW Line project was symptomatic of the 
Canadian struggle for control. The Canadian government did not passively 
subordinate its continental defence policy to the United States in this regard, 
but an unwieldy list of conditions governing American participation in the 
DEW Line did not have the desired result. Charles Wilson’s observations not-
withstanding, Canadian public concerns over the American presence in the 
Arctic remained for many years after the DEW Line’s construction began.
 This examination of Canada-United States collaboration on the DEW Line 
during 1954 is important for an understanding of Canadian and American 
perspectives of each other over a fundamental issue. There certainly is a trad-
ition of Canada-U.S continental defence cooperation; this cooperation began 
in earnest during the Second World War, entered its crucial period in the 
Cold War in the 1950s, and has continued to the present day. A constant ele-
ment in this cooperation is the issue of national control. Consistently missing 
in North American defence cooperation is an appropriate understanding of 
the national perspectives behind desires for control. With respect to the con-
struction of the DEW Line, each side attempted to exert its degree of control 
as much “as practicable.” 
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